The Death of Corporate Law

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Abstract

For decades, corporate law played a pivotal role in regulating corporations across the United States. Consequently, Delaware, the leading state of incorporation, and its courts came to occupy a central and influential position in corporate law and governance. This, however, is no longer the case: The compositional shift in equity markets from retail to institutional ownership has relocated regulatory power over corporations from courts to markets. Corporate law has, as a result, and as illustrated by the decline of the Delaware courts, lost its pride of place and is now largely a dead letter. What explains the connection between the rise of institutional ownership and the death of corporate law? We answer this question by unpacking the relationship between market dynamics and the role of corporate law. Our analysis uncovers a critical, yet hitherto unnoticed, insight: The more competent shareholders become, the less important corporate law will be. Increases in shareholder competence reduce management agency costs, intensify market actors’ preference for private ordering outside of courts, and, ultimately, drive corporate law into oblivion.

Keywords: Corporate Law, Corporate Governance, Delaware Courts, Institutional Investors, Hedge Fund Activism, Control Rights, Corporate Litigation, Principal Costs, Agency Costs, Incomplete Contracts, Contract Design, Enforcement

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What explains the connection between the rise of institutional ownership and the death of corporate law? We answer this question by unpacking the relationship between market dynamics and the role of corporate law. Our analysis uncovers a critical, yet hitherto unnoticed, insight: The more competent shareholders become, the less important corporate law will be. Increases in shareholder competence reduce management agency costs, intensify market actors’ preference for private ordering outside of courts, and, ultimately, drive corporate law into oblivion.
INTRODUCTION

For decades, corporate law played a pivotal role in regulating corporations across the United States. Consequently, Delaware, the leading state of incorporation, and its courts played a central part in corporate law and governance.\(^1\) More than half of publicly traded firms are incorporated in Delaware,\(^2\) and in many law schools in the United States, Delaware corporate law has become virtually synonymous with American corporate law.\(^3\) While some experts have praised Delaware courts for their efficiency

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3. See, e.g., Melvin Aaron Eisenberg & James D. Cox, Business Organizations: Cases and Materials (11th ed. 2014) (providing a Delaware-centric approach to corporate law); William A. Klein et al., Business Associations: Cases and Materials on Agency, Partnerships, LLCs, and Corporations (9th ed. 2015) (same). Many scholars have attributed the centrality of Delaware courts in corporate law to Delaware’s unique judicial system. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 709, 722 (1987) [hereinafter Romano, State Competition] (noting Delaware’s “case law” and
and sophistication in adjudicating corporate disputes, and others have accused the Delaware courts of pro-management leanings, very few would dispute the fact that Delaware courts have played a critical role in shaping corporate law in the United States.

This Article argues that corporate law is no longer vital to the regulation of U.S. corporations. The transformation of American equity markets from retail to institutional ownership has relocated control over corporations from courts to markets and has led to the death of corporate law. As a result, and as an illustration of this broader phenomenon, Delaware courts today play a fundamentally different—and much less influential—role in corporate disputes. Indeed, we show that corporate law jurisprudence originating from the Delaware courts is no longer “alive” as a substantive regulatory influence. While other scholars have argued that Delaware’s retreat reflects judicial volition, our point here is different: We argue that the transformation of U.S. equity markets has eliminated the Delaware courts’ authority to determine the extent of their own institutional

“judicial expertise in corporate law” contribute to its dominance); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 225, 277—78 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, Law as a Product] (describing the benefits accruing from Delaware’s “substantial body” of precedent, its “judicial expertise” in corporate law, and the predictability of its judicial decisions).

4 See, e.g., William Savitt, The Genius of the Modern Chancery System, 2012 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 570—71 (“The Court’s approach has allowed it to supervise the market for corporate control and clarify the competing rights and obligations of corporate stakeholders with efficiency uncommon for a common law court.”).

5 See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663, 670—84 (1974) (“Judicial decisions in Delaware illustrate that the courts have undertaken to carry out the ‘public policy’ of the state and create a ‘favorable climate’ for management.”).

6 See, infra Section III.A.

7 Our title intentionally paraphrases that of Professor Grant Gilmore’s seminal book, The Death of Contract (1974). Just as Gilmore argued that contract law had been steadily absorbed and superseded by tort law, id. at 87, we aim to demonstrate that corporate law has largely been displaced by the use of discretionary control rights wielded by market actors. See infra Part I.

But why has the rise of institutional ownership coincided with the death of corporate law? In this Article, we answer this question by unpacking the relationship between market dynamics and law, which allows us to present the core insight of our novel theory: The more competent shareholders become, the less important corporate law will be. By applying this general insight to the Delaware courts, we are able to explain the decline of the Delaware courts and to discuss the legal and policy implications of this insight for the future of Delaware.

We begin with the decline of Delaware courts. Until recently, Delaware courts engaged in a high level of judicial involvement with corporate disputes. Historically, conflicts over corporate control in the United States frequently originated from hostile takeover attempts. In a series of landmark decisions beginning in the 1980s, Delaware courts played a pivotal role in the resolution of this breed of disputes. In its celebrated Unocal decision, the Delaware Supreme Court held that board-adopted defenses against hostile takeovers would receive enhanced judicial scrutiny. Later decisions applying Unocal allowed boards to unilaterally adopt poison pills and then “just-say-no” to hostile takeovers, notwithstanding shareholders’ desires.

Meanwhile, the Court of Chancery’s holding in Blasius provided courts with the means to scrutinize board interference with shareholder voting rights. Unocal and Blasius—along with the court’s development of so-called “Revlon duties” that apply to board behavior in change-of-control scenarios—entrenched the Delaware courts’ position as the

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9 See infra Part II.
10 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, at 954—55 (Del. 1985). (“If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”).
11 Moran v. Household Intern., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). While poison pills come in many different varieties, the critical takeaway for purposes of understanding Moran and the significance of the poison pill is that “the key concept behind the poison pill is that it deters a potential acquirer from purchasing the stock of the target by making a takeover unprofitable.” Jordan M. Barry, John William Hatfield, Pills and Partisans: Understanding Takeover Defenses, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 633, 642 (2012); see also Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 205, 209 (2005) (“Conventional wisdom is that the presence of an unredeemed poison pill makes a takeover prohibitively expensive for the bidder.”).
12 Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661—62 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that boards “bear [] the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justification” when taking any action “for the primary purpose of interfering with the effectiveness of a corporate vote”). Blasius was later approved by the Delaware Supreme Court. See Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 927 (Del. 1990) (citing to Blasius for the proposition that The Delaware General Corporation Law has a general “policy against disenfranchisement”).
ultimate arbiter of corporate control disputes. This power effectively allowed the courts to dictate the allocation of control rights between boards and shareholders.

All of this, however, has changed. Delaware courts no longer wield this same level of influence. With respect to control rights, here are just a few illustrations of the courts’ waning influence. Consider the fact that while boards are free under Delaware jurisprudence to adopt a poison pill to fend off hostile takeovers, directors are hesitant to do so, fearing shareholders’ reaction. As a result, in more than half of all contemporary hostile bids, a poison pill is never implemented, even after the hostile bid launched. Similarly, although the Delaware courts permit boards to use a poison-pill together with a staggered-board—a combination some consider takeover-preclusive—shareholder activists have managed nonetheless to dismantle most staggered boards via pressure exerted outside the courtroom.

Moreover, and perhaps most strikingly, the use of “hedge-fund activism” has become a routine method for shareholders to wield control rights outside of courts. Activist hedge funds will procure a relatively

14 With respect to cash flow rights the Delaware courts have in several recent cases similarly, and explicitly, shifted power to shareholders. See, infra Section I.B.3.
15 For a more detailed list of such developments, see infra Section I.B.
17 See Guhan Subramanian, Delaware’s Choice, 39 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 5 (2014) [hereinafter Subramanian, Delaware’s Choice] (“[I]n recent years 59% of companies without pills have not put them in when a [hostile] bid is brought.”).
18 See, e.g., Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 57 (Del. Ch. 2011) (approving the board’s continued use of a poison pill even when combined with a staggered board—a board in which only third of its members are up for re-election every year). The significance of combining a staggered board with a poison pill is, stated most simply, as follows: Poison pills, which allow managers to stymie a hostile takeover attempt as long as the managers remain in office, operate under the assumption that the shareholders’ ability to “vote out” the managers acts as a “safety valve” to this absolute blockade. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et. al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887, 890 (2002). If a board is staggered, however, requiring multiple years of voting before a majority of the board can be voted out, this safety valve becomes “illusory.” Id.
19 Id. at 919 (“[Staggered boards] should provide incumbents virtually complete protection from hostile bids, with all of the potential drawbacks in terms of managerial agency costs.”).
22 For background on the ability of hedge-fund activists to assert control rights, see generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863
small stake in a company, issue a “white paper” detailing criticisms of the company’s management, and then campaign for other shareholders to vote against management in a proxy fight. To avoid the fiasco of a public proxy dispute, and despite the Delaware courts’ approval of anti-activist poison pills, companies often settle with activists behind the scenes, for example, by allowing the activist to appoint individuals of its choosing to the company’s board. Activists can thus sidestep judicial oversight altogether by taking advantage of the pressure generated by their threat of a proxy fight, rendering corporate law entirely irrelevant.

What brought about the death of corporate law? This Article answers this complicated question with a novel theory that analyzes the relationship between market dynamics and the law. The starting point for our theory is the understanding that corporate contracts are always “incomplete.” The principal (the shareholders) invests in, and the agent (the board) manages, a firm, in order to create future value. But, beyond the general instruction to “maximize firm value,” there are few (if any) enforceable precepts as to how to manage the firm. Instead, the parties agree

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23 A proxy fight is “a campaign to solicit votes (or proxies) in opposition to management at an annual or special meeting of stockholders or through action by written consent.” Warren de Weid, Wilson Sonsini (Nov. 2010), https://www.wsgr.com/publications/pdfs/search/dewied1110.pdf (providing introductory information on modern proxy contests). For an overview of the toolkit used by activist investors, see also Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist Investors, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Law and Governance (Jan. 26, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/26/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-and-other-activist-investors/.


25 In Third Point, for instance, the hedge-fund plaintiff refused to abandon its campaign and instead used the threat of a proxy fight to leverage the board into completely conceding to its demands. See Augosto Fontevecchia, Truce! Dan Loeb’s Third Point Gets 3 Board Seats, But Sotheby’s CEO Bill Ruprecht Stays On Board, Forbes (May 5, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2014/05/05/truce-dan-loebs-third-point-gets-3-board-seats-but-sothebys-ceo-bill-ruprecht-stays-on-board/#4987ebc9b63e. Even in dramatic public proxy fights, settlements are not uncommon. See, Michael J. de la Merced, Arconic Settles with Elliot After Bruising and Public Dispute, N.Y. Times (May 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/business/dealbook/arconic-elliott-settlement.html (describing one such settlement after a very public, and highly contentious, proxy fight).

26 See infra section I.B.2. Activists may only turn to a court if the threat of a proxy fight fails to generate the desired response. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Why Einhorn's Win May Be Apple's Gain, N.Y. Times: Dealbook (Feb. 26, 2013, 10:02 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/26/why-einhorns-win-may-be-apples-gain/ (“Had the proposal gone to a vote at the shareholder meeting on Wednesday, [the activist] would likely have lost and the charter would have been amended. So he took a different tactic. He sued.”).

27 See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 Econometrica 755, 755 (1988) (“Since it may be prohibitively costly to specify, in a way that can be enforced, the precise actions that each party should take in every conceivable eventuality, the parties are in practice likely to end up writing a highly incomplete contract.”).
to a general allocation of control rights (which govern the apportionment of decisionmaking power over the firm) and cash-flow rights (which govern the apportionment of firm-generated value). In this incomplete contract, conflicts may arise as to the allocation and use of these two types of rights.  

The principal and the agent, therefore, must decide which conflicts to resolve on their own—via discretionary control rights such as shareholder voting—and which conflicts to resolve with the aid of a court—via duty-enforcement rights such as the right to sue for breach of directors’ fiduciary duties.

But when will shareholders and boards choose to engage courts in resolving corporate disputes as opposed to resolving conflicts via discretionary control rights? The theory expounded in this Article answers this important question. The exercise of corporate control rights generates control costs—which include competence and conflict costs—for both the principal (“principal costs”) and the agent (“agent costs”). Under conventional economic assumptions, shareholders and boards will aim to minimize the sum of those costs in order to increase firm value. Critically, we observe that enlisting courts in an effort to reduce these control costs will itself impose both competence costs and conflict costs spawned by the adjudication process. Therefore, the use of courts will only be efficient when it minimizes the total control costs created by all three players—the principal, the agent, and the courts.

Our theory shows that the relative magnitude of principal competence and court competence is a crucial determinant of whether the parties will prefer judicial intervention as opposed to the use of discretionary control rights. When the principal has relatively low competence (as with retail investors) the parties are more likely to rely on a court for dispute resolution. By contrast, when the principal has relatively

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28 Corporate control rights conflicts are most visible in contests for control over the entire corporation, such as a hostile takeover in which one corporation attempts to acquire another. Challenging the right of the target corporation’s board to adopt “takeover defenses” without shareholders consent is a dispute over the allocation of control rights between the board and shareholders. Disputes over the allocation of cash-flow rights, on the other hand, arise when a conflict has the potential to influence the division of cash flows or assets. For example, minority shareholders in a public corporation may dispute whether the price offered for the minority shares by the controlling owner in a merger was fair.

29 See infra Part II (discussing our theory and applying it to various hypothetical scenarios).

30 Control costs include the efforts taken by parties to avoid the incursion of these costs. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 767, 779 (2017) (providing a detailed description and discussion of both principal costs and agent costs). Control costs can also stem from asymmetric information and differences of opinion between principals and agents. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 Yale L.J. 560, 565 (2016).

31 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 30, at 784, 829 (discussing minimizing control costs in the context of optimal governance structure).
high competence (as with institutional investors\textsuperscript{32}), the parties are more likely to resolve these issues on their own through the use of discretionary control rights. The efficiency of extra-judicial conflict-resolution positively correlates with the principal’s competence. The more competent the principal, the greater is the probability that actors will prefer using discretionary control rights to resolve disputes outside of the adjudication process.

As increased institutional ownership and complementary market mechanisms (such as hedge fund activism\textsuperscript{33} and proxy advisors\textsuperscript{34}) bolster the competence of U.S. investors, our theory predicts—and reality seems to vindicate—that judicial dispute resolution becomes a less desirable option. And as companies have grown accustomed to the ability of institutional investors to discipline management outside of the courtroom,\textsuperscript{35} companies have come to care more about their investors’ \textit{business opinions} than about the Delaware courts’ \textit{judicial opinions}.\textsuperscript{36} Over time, this dynamic

\begin{itemize}
  \item Institutional investors have higher competence as shareholders because they employ teams of professional investment managers who are knowledgeable and experienced in business and finance.
  \item For more on hedge fund activism, see infra section I.B.2.
  \item Proxy advisory firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass, Lewis & Co. (Glass Lewis), provide institutional investors with recommendations on proxy votes, theoretically providing institutional investors with the opinion of experts wielding the time and resources to analyze individual proxy votes in ways that institutional shareholders cannot. See generally George W. Dent, Jr., A Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1287, 1291—96 (2014). Because proxy advisors, for a variety of reasons, have made votes \textit{against} corporate management more common, their presence in the market has shifted the locus of power in any given proxy vote further toward the institutional owners. See id at 1289.
  \item See, e.g., Madison Marriage BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Bulk Up Governance Staff, Financial Times (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/657b243c-e492-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a?mhq5j=e2. It is worth noting that many have optimistically embraced the increased activism of institutional investors. See, e.g., David Larrabee, The Financial Industry: A New Discipline of Ownership, CFA Institute Enterprising Investor (June 6, 2017), https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2017/06/06/the-financial-industry-a-new-discipline-of-ownership/ (calling the present a “pivotal moment for the industry, when institutional investors went from being passive owners to embracing their roles as responsible stewards for the industry, their customers, and society.”). Indeed, institutional investors have become aggressive in their disciplinary behavior, going as far to threaten to vote against directors for all boards upon which they sit, even those not committing the disputed action. Jessica Toonkel, Big Fund Firm Blacklists Directors Who Support Poison Pills, Reuters, (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-dfa-poisonpills-boards-insight-idUSKBN0NK0AM20150429.
\end{itemize}
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has made corporate law marginal and had eroded the significance of the Delaware courts.

The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I illustrates the death of corporate law through a discussion of the evolution and decline of the Delaware courts. Part II presents our principal–agent theory concerning the role of courts in corporate-dispute resolution. Part III discusses the policy implications of the theory we present in Part II, as well as predictions for the future. We then briefly conclude.

I. THE DECLINE OF DELAWARE COURTS

In the recent past, corporate America held its breath in anticipation of the Delaware courts' rulings; the Delaware courts held the ultimate power to influence and even craft the rules of the corporate game. The Delaware courts no longer occupy this same predominance as an arbiter of corporate conflict. This Part explores the special, and central, role of the Delaware courts (Section I.A) and the more recent decline that has occurred (Section I.B). We focus on Delaware in order to illustrate the death of corporate law more broadly because Delaware is widely considered the most important corporate law forum. But our theory, presented fully in Part II, is not forum-dependent.

A. The Delaware Court as Arbiter of Corporate Conflict

In their seminal book The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Professor Adolf Berle and economist Gardiner Means highlighted the dispersed ownership structure of many U.S. public corporations. Berle and Means suggested that the many minuscule retail investors populating the U.S. capital market were unable to exercise any control over the corporations in which they held shares. Taking account of this weakness, the Delaware courts took up the role of shareholder guardian. The Delaware courts approached this role with a dichotomous focus, separating self-dealing transactions (transactions in which a controlling owner, the board, or management participates on both sides), on the one hand, from all other business decisions, on the other.

38 Id. at 66.
39 In cases of self-dealing, the Delaware Courts scrutinize the business terms of the transaction reached by the board under the so-called “entire fairness” doctrine. This assessment often requires the court to perform complicated financial valuation, a feat only practicable due to the relative financially savvy of Delaware judges. See, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983).
40 For non-self-dealing corporate decisions and transactions, the court adheres to the deferential “business judgment rule” and refrains from second-guessing the business decisions of the board and the management. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811—13 (Del. 1984).
The unprecedented wave of mergers and acquisitions during the 1980s intensified the role of the Delaware courts as arbiter between boards and shareholders over control rights conflicts. Control fights between corporate boards and would-be acquirers required the courts to determine the extent to which boards may decide, notwithstanding the desires of shareholders, whether, and to whom, to sell the company. Much of modernity’s relevant takeover jurisprudence crystalized during this 1980s heyday; *Unocal* and its progeny, in developing a flexible and fact-intensive standard of review for anti-takeover mechanisms, affirmed an active role for the Delaware courts in the takeover context. The Delaware Supreme Court made clear that under *Unocal*, anti-takeover measures taken by boards would be reviewed under the business judgment rule only if such measures were found to be “reasonable in relation to the threat posed.” *Unocal* epitomizes the tendency of the Delaware courts, when faced with a dispute over control rights, to take on an interventionist role governed by a standard-like balancing test.

*Unocal* was far from the last instance of Delaware’s willingness to redefine the corporate contract between a board and shareholders. In *Moran*, decided the same year as *Unocal*, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled upon the fate of the “poison pill,” at the time a new defensive innovation. The *Moran* opinion openly acknowledged the necessity of redrafting the corporate contract in response to the perceived potency of the pill, reflecting self-awareness as to the importance of the Delaware court’s role. The *Moran* court ultimately decided to validate the adoption of the poison pill subject to the discretion of the court to invalidate the pill in the future, once an actual takeover bid is launched. Acknowledging the impact of the *Moran* decision on corporate law, one popular Corporate Law casebook

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43 Id. See also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995) (glossing the *Unocal* standard such that defendant boards and directors must prove the defensive tactics at issue are neither “preclusive” nor “coercive”).

44 *Moran* v. Household Intern., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). Poison pills are also known as shareholders’ right plans and they come in different variations. A typical plan sets a threshold, say 20%, that will operate as a trigger, in case a bidder purchased shares beyond the threshold without the board’s consent, leading to heavy dilution of the bidder by issuing massive amount of rights to buy additional shares at a great discount to all other shareholders.

45 *Moran*, 500 A.2d at 1347 (Del. 1985) (“This case presents to this Court for review the most recent defensive mechanism in the arsenal of corporate takeover weaponry.”).

46 Id. (“The validity of this mechanism has attracted national attention . . .”).

47 Id. at 1357 (“While we conclude for present purposes that the Household directors are protected by the business judgment rule, that does end the matter. The ultimate response to an actual takeover bid must be judged by the Directors’ actions at that time . . . Their use of the Plan will be evaluated when and if the issue arises.”
later observed the following: "Judicial acceptance of shareholders' right plans was a major evolutionary step in U.S. corporate law."

Given the centrality of the Delaware courts in these high-stake corporate scuffles, it was unsurprising that the Delaware courts became subject to heavy lobbying efforts. A considerable portion of this lobbying targeted the issue left open by Unocal and Moran: How much discretion should a board be granted when maintaining a poison pill in the face of a lucrative takeover bid? This question, whether the board can "just say no," was contemporaneously described by Professors Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman as the "single most important issue" regarding the market for corporate control. Following the Delaware Chancery's ruling in Interco, implying the ability to "just say no" ran afoul of Unocal's proportionality requirement, lobbying intensified.

Martin Lipton, leveraging his clout as legal counsel to some of the nation's largest corporations, sent well-publicized client memos in an effort to exert pressure on the Interco verdict. Lipton characterized Interco as a "dagger aimed at the hearts of all Delaware corporations" and urged Delaware corporations to incorporate elsewhere, sending the clear message that the Delaware Supreme Court ought to revisit the issue.

In Time, the Delaware Supreme Court took up the invitation to revisit Interco and in so doing redrew the lines of U.S. corporate control once again. The Delaware Supreme Court characterized Interco as a "narrow and rigid" interpretation and ultimately permitted Time's board to reject a $200 per-share bid from Paramount (nearly a 60% premium over

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49 See, e.g., infra notes 55—56 and accompanying text.
53 Id. at 799—800 ("the board's decision not to redeem the rights following the amendment of the offer to $74 per share cannot be justified in the way Unocal requires.").
54 The Interco Case, Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to clients (Nov. 3, 1988) (on file with the authors).
55 Id.
56 Id. ("New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania, among others, are far more desirable states for incorporation than Delaware in this takeover era. Perhaps it is time to migrate out of Delaware."). In a second memo, published after Grand Metro. Public Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988), Lipton continued with the same tone: "Unless Delaware acts quickly to correct the Pillsbury decision, the only avenues open to the half of major American companies incorporated in Delaware will be federal legislation . . . or leaving Delaware for a more hospitable state of incorporation." You Can't Say No in Delaware No More, Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (Dec. 17, 1988).
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market price). Time lead many to conclude that boards could in fact “just say no,” a result many scholars deemed to have a major impact on the market as a whole.

Later decisions made clear that the Delaware court intended to cement the proxy mechanism as an avenue for replacing directors via the shareholder vote, notwithstanding the significant leeway granted to boards under Time with respect to tender offers. This strict preservation of the shareholder franchise came to a head in Blasius, in which the Chancery court prevented the Atlas board from amending the company’s bylaws in order to add two new board seats and then fill the newly created vacancies, a maneuver clearly intended to preempt an attempt by one of its shareholders to nominate a majority of new directors. Chancellor Allen’s decision expressly acknowledged that it set the boundaries of control over the company. The Blasius court held that, absent a “compelling justification,” boards may not interfere with the proxy mechanism, thereby providing a protective counterweight to the board discretion afforded under Unocal.

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58 For the sake of comparison, consider the fact that in Interco, the board rejected a $74 per share bid from Cardinal Acquisition Corporation, with a much lower premium over market value than was offered in Paramount, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).


60 Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871, 878—79 (2002) ("Merger and acquisition activity declined sharply around the time of the Time-Warner decision and in its immediate aftermath, with the decline in hostile acquisitions being particularly pronounced. . . . the value of M&A deals fell from its 1988 peak of $247 billion, to $221 billion in 1989, to $108 billion in 1990, and then to $71 billion in 1991...The decline thus seemed to validate the views of scholars and practitioners about the significance of 'just say no'.").

61 Id. at 660 ("A board's decision to act to prevent the shareholders from creating a majority of new board positions . . . rather, it involves allocation, between shareholders as a class and the board, of effective power with respect to governance of the corporation."). For a fascinating description of the origin of the Blasius standard, see Leo E. Strine, Jr, The Story of Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp.: Keeping the Electoral Path to Takeovers Clear, in J. Mark Ramseyer, ed, Corporate Law Stories 243, 290-91 (Foundation 2009).

62 Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659. See also Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987) ("The board bears the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justification."). Gilson questions the logic behind this policy decision to protect shareholders'
When the dust settled, the outcome of 1980s Delaware jurisprudence was a new allocative equilibrium of control rights between boards and shareholders.\(^{65}\) Given the malleability of *Unocal’s* balancing analysis, a great many control contests found their way to the Delaware courts, repeatedly giving Delaware courts the final say on shaping corporate behavior in the context of control tussles.\(^{66}\)

### B. The Changed Role of the Delaware Courts

In recent years there has been a noticeable decline in the role played by the Delaware courts, such that decisions of the Delaware courts, though legally binding, no longer mark the exclusive or final chapter over control rights conflicts. This Section begins by illustrating the decline of Delaware courts with a few telling examples (Section I.B.1) before discussing hedge fund activism as the most salient manifestation of extra-judicial corporate control dispute resolution (Section I.B.2). Finally, we show that the Delaware courts’ reaction to its reduced role has also been generally welcoming in the context of cash-flow rights conflicts (Section I.B.3).

1. **Telling Examples of The Decline: Poison Pills, Staggered Boards, Golden Leashes, and Indices Exclusion**

One of the most striking examples of the decline of the Delaware court has been the marked shift regarding poison pills and staggered boards. As already noted, the Delaware courts created a longstanding equilibrium in which target companies could—and often did—maintain staggered boards and poison pills,\(^{67}\) forcing would-be acquirers to cope with these obstacles.\(^{68}\) Today, both staggered boards and poison pills are fading from right to vote but not to sell their shares: “[T]he lesson of *Unocal’s* first fifteen years is that the Delaware Supreme Court's march toward an unarticulated and unjustified preference for elections over markets . . . has proven to be a failure.” Gilson J. Ronald, *Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It)*, 26 Del. J. Corp. L., 491, 512 (2001).

\(^{67}\) See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prod. & Chemicals, Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1194 (Del. 2010); see also supra section I.A.

\(^{68}\) Bebchuk and others have demonstrated the power of a staggered board, showing that an effective staggered board nearly doubles the likelihood the average target will remain independent. Bebchuk et al., supra note 18, at 890—91 (“A staggered board . . . offers a more powerful antitakeover defense than has previously been recognized . . . [because it] make[s] it extremely difficult for a hostile bidder to gain control over the incumbents' objections.”).
the market, leaving managers far more vulnerable—the court had no role
in this watershed change. More pointedly: Rather than lobby the Delaware
courts directly for revision to the doctrine governing staggered boards and
poison pills, critics of these takeover protection mechanisms simply exerted
extra-judicial pressure to de facto “rule” on the permissibility of these tools.

Staggered Boards. Consider first staggered boards. During the first
decade of the millennium, staggered boards were highly popular; in year
2000, 300 companies in the S&P 500 had staggered boards. In the last
half-decade, the number of companies making use of a staggered board has
fallen dramatically. Much of this change is the product of cooperation
between large pension funds and the Shareholder Rights Project ("SRP"),
a clinical program at Harvard Law School directed by Professor Lucian
Bebchuk. The SRP's work during 2012-2014 focused on dismantling
classified (staggered) boards. The campaign was tremendously successful
and led to the declassification of 102 S&P 500 and Fortune 500 companies
by the end of 2015. As of January 2017, less than 105 of the corporations
in the S&P 500 have staggered boards.

Poison Pills. Poison pills have similarly faced a sharp decline. In
2000, 299 companies in the S&P 500 had a poison pill in place. By
January 2017, that number shrank to 17. In the interim, and continuing
to this day, influential proxy advisors announced their objection to
the adoption of poison pills without shareholder approval, and threatened to

69 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Charles C.Y. Wang, Staggered Boards
and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments (Harvard John M.
70 See infra notes 73—74 (providing evidence of the decline in staggered board use).
71 The decline in the usage of staggered boards started before the SRP project.
Institutional investors and other shareholders opposed them in light of studies that found a
negative relationship between staggered board and the company shares price. Id; see also
Matthew D. Cain et al., How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash,
72 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk: Biographical Information, Harvard Law Sch. (last
program ceased operations in the summer of 2014. These public pension funds had an
aggregate value of assets exceeding $400 billion and served over three million members. Id.
74 Lucian Bebchuk et al., Toward Board Declassification in 100 S&P 500 and
Fortune 500 Companies: The SRP's Report for the 2012 and 2013 Proxy Seasons, Harv. L.
76 Michael Useem, The Ascent of Shareholder Monitoring and Strategic Partnering:
The Dual Functions of the Corporate Board, in The SAGE Handbook of Corporate
77 Id.
recommend voting against the re-nomination of directors who implement such pills.\textsuperscript{78} As a result, while boards are free under Delaware law to adopt a poison pill, directors are as a practical matter hesitant and constrained in their ability to do so, fearing the wrath of proxy advisors and institutional investors.\textsuperscript{79} In fact, in more than half of all contemporary hostile bids, a poison pill is never implemented, even after the hostile bid has launched.\textsuperscript{80} This reduction in the implementation and use of two of the most popular (and powerful) takeover defenses has reshaped the corporate control equilibrium almost entirely outside the Delaware courts.

\textit{Golden Leashes.} This trend of market forces acting as the primary engine re-allocating corporate control has not been limited to staggered boards and poison pills. Another telling example is the rise and fall of restrictions on “golden leashes,” a favorite tool of activist hedge funds. A golden leash is an incentive compensation scheme granted to a director nominated to a board by an activist shareholder, whereby the director receives a compensatory reward from the hedge fund for achieving certain activist-determined goals.\textsuperscript{81} In the early days of golden leashes, dozens of public companies facing or expecting activism campaigns reacted by restricting the use of golden leashes in their corporate bylaws. From a legal standpoint, it is an open (and intriguing) question as to whether golden leashes compromise the fiduciary duties of the director held by the leash, so to speak.\textsuperscript{82} It is an equally open question as to whether bylaws provisions prohibiting such pay schemes are even \textit{permissible} under Delaware law.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{78} Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, in Institutional Investor Activism: Hedge Funds and Private Equity, Economics and Regulation 617, 669 (William Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2015) ("The success of proxy advisors in forcing target companies to place a short time limit on their 'poison pills' (usually one year) under the threat that the proxy advisors would otherwise recommend a vote against management's nominees in any proxy contest."). The 2017 Glass Lewis proxy guidelines advised shareholders to vote against "[a]ll board members who served at a time when a poison pill with a term of longer than one year was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months." 2017 Proxy Paper Guidelines: An Overview of the Glass Lewis Approach to Proxy Advice, Glass Lewis (2017), http://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Guidelines_US.pdf; See also Toonkel, supra note 35.

\textsuperscript{79} See 2009 Trends in Corporate Governance of the Largest US Public Companies, Shearman & Sterling LLP (2009), https://capitalaberto.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/General_Governance_Practices_1_.pdf ("Eighteen of the 40 institutional shareholders surveyed would consider poison pill proposals on a case-by-case basis. Eleven of such institutional shareholders would generally vote against poison pill proposals, but would consider the proposal on a case-by-case basis under some circumstances. However, nine institutional shareholders surveyed are against poison pills without exception.").

\textsuperscript{80} See Subramanian, Delaware’s Choice, supra note 17, at 5 ("[I]n recent years 59% of companies without pills have not put them in when a [hostile] bid is brought.").


\textsuperscript{82} See id at 1274 (discussing some of the issues surrounding this question of golden leashes insofar as they intersect with potential fiduciary duty violations).

\textsuperscript{83} Id. at 1246. Vice Chancellor Travis Laster recently suggested that golden leash arrangements may constitute conflicts of interest \textit{per se}. In re PLX Technology Inc.
However, as described below, these questions were not litigated in court but rather were de facto decided through the exercise of discretionary control rights.

In May of 2013, the law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (“Wachtell”), issued a memorandum recommending corporations adopt a bylaw prohibiting golden leashes. Soon thereafter, thirty-two companies adopted a bylaw doing exactly that. In response, the proxy advisor Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) recommended that shareholders withhold votes from the members of the Nominating and Governance Committee of Provident (“NGCP”), one of the firms that had adopted the bylaw. In turn, NGCP’s director nominees received a withhold vote of 34%, signaling widespread investor dissatisfaction. ISS later threatened more withhold recommendations with respect to firms adopting golden leash restrictions. By May of 2014, 28 of the 32 companies that had adopted anti-golden-leash bylaws had removed them, and by January 2016 only three issuers retained the bylaw. Even Wachtell eventually acknowledged that the adoption of the bylaw could pose an investor-relationship problem. Here again, a complex and pressing corporate governance issue was addressed entirely outside litigation, relying instead on pressure exerted by market actors.

Indices Exclusion. As of this writing, yet another extrajudicial change of major legal consequence is brewing among private actors: Certain shareholder advocates are seeking to eliminate the increasing use of multi-class share structures that limit or eliminate the voting rights of certain classes of shareholders, by excluding issuers of multi-class shares from stock indices. Shortly after Snap, Inc.’s $3.4 billion IPO in March of 2017,

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See infra notes 85—90 and accompanying text.


85 Cain et al., supra note 71, at 672 (“[T]he golden leash . . . and the bylaw proposed in response to it as a case study of corporate governance innovation in contemporary capital market.”).

86 Id. at 673.

87 Id. at 653.

88 Id. at 667.


90 Shares of companies that have gone through an Initial Public Offering are frequently included in indices based on criteria that have nothing to do with corporate
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wherein Snap controversially offered common stock without voting rights, Standard & Poor announced that it intends to bar companies with “multiple class structures” from inclusion in the S&P 500 index. Whatever one’s views of the merits of multi-class share structures, the attempt by the S&P 500 to impinge on the contracting freedom typically awarded to private parties at the IPO stage, rather than waiting to challenge this behavior in court, is telling. This is yet another extraordinary illustration of extrajudicial actors replacing the Delaware courts as arbiters of consequential issues of corporate law and governance.


93 Andrea Tan & Benjamin Robertson, Why Investors are Fretting Over Dual-Class Shares, Bloomberg (July 10, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-10/why-investors-are-fretting-over-dual-class-shares-quicktake-q-a (describing some of the concerns shareholders have with multi-class share structures).

94 Still outside of the courtroom, shareholders successfully managed to change public corporations’ bylaws in order to implement “majority vote” in directors’ elections and “proxy-access” shareholder proposals, thereby gaining additional control rights.

A majority vote provision requires that a director will receive the support of a majority of shareholders for reappointment, as oppose to plurality vote that only requires getting more votes than the competing candidate. See, e.g., Shearman & Sterling, Majority Voting Standards (2015), https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/shearman-majority-voting.pdf (describing the “dramatic” increase in the use of majority voting, as opposed to plurality voting, in director elections between 2006 and 2015).

A proxy access provision requires boards to include shareholder-nominated director candidates in companies’ annual proxy statements. For an overview of the significance and success of votes adding proxy access provisions to firm bylaws, see Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, 2016 Proxy Season Review (July 11, 2016), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2016_Proxy_Season_Review.pdf. See also Lisa M. Fairfax, The Theory Business Corporation Act at Sixty: Shareholders and Their Influence, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 2011, at 19, 25 (“In recent years not only has there been an increase in proxy fights, but there also has been an increase in the relative success of such fights.”).
2. Hedge Fund Activism and Extrajudicial Resolution of Corporate Conflict

Section I.B.1 discussed several symptoms of the death of corporate law in Delaware. In this Section, we turn to the mechanics of hedge fund activism, a major extra-judicial force allowing market participants to sidestep the Delaware courts.

Hedge fund activism constitutes a significant channel through which shareholders increasingly settle controversies with management, almost entirely outside the courtroom. Hedge funds agitate for corporate reform on a case-by-case basis, with institutional investors largely determining the fate of these initiatives via the exercise of their voting rights.95 Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged as a viable, and prominent, corporate governance mechanism.96 Activist funds seek to secure value for shareholders (and boost profits for investors in the funds themselves) by nudging, with varying degrees of force, corporations to act in certain ways.97 To this end, hedge funds have promoted, among other initiatives, stock buybacks, dividend distributions, spin-offs of major units, mergers or sales of the company, and replacements of management.98

In year 2015, 556 activist hedge funds held a total of $142 billion in assets under management.99 Since 2006, nearly one of every six S&P 1500 corporations has been the target of an activist campaign, and the numbers continue to rise.100

When conflicts between hedge funds and targeted management do reach a court, judicial intervention is unlikely to be decisive. That is to say, when hedge funds initiate a legal procedure, it is often meant to either place additional pressure on the management or address a protective measure

96 For some of the aspects in which hedge fund activism is distinguishable from other institutional activism, see, e.g., Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 Found. & Trends Fin. 185, 186—87 (2010).
98 Sharon Hannes, Super Hedge Fund, 40 Del. J. Corp. L.163, 190—191 (2015) [hereinafter Hannes, Super Hedge Fund] (suggesting that ‘a novel market mechanism, a 'super hedge fund', would maintain the benefits of hedge fund activism, while curbing its downsides”). See also, Brav et al., supra note 96, at 198.
taken by the target board, rather than to secure a particular disposition. Consider *Third Point*, wherein defendant Sotheby’s adopted a two-tiered poison pill \(^{101}\) specifically intended to thwart activist hedge funds.\(^ {102}\) Denying Third Point’s (an activist hedge fund) motion to preliminarily enjoin Sotheby’s pill, the court found that the Sotheby’s board’s adoption and maintenance of the two-tiered pill proportionally responded to the threat posed by Third Point within the bounds of *Unocal* scrutiny.\(^ {103}\)

*Third Point* granted Sotheby’s board an ostensible victory in court, and yet, in reality, this victory was decidedly hollow. In May of 2014, after a grueling proxy fight, Sotheby’s and Third Point reached an agreement, whereby Sotheby’s expanded its board to 15 members and reserved three seats for Third Point candidates, including Third Point’s founder Dan Loeb. In addition, Sotheby’s agreed to remove its poison pill, thus allowing Third Point to raise its stake in Sotheby’s to 15%.\(^ {104}\) This deal was struck just one day before Sotheby’s annual meeting, reflecting the immense pressure exerted by Sotheby’s shareholders and ISS upon the board to concede.\(^ {105}\)

This result is not unique to Sotheby’s. In fact, despite the court’s approval of management unilateral adoption of anti-activist poison pills in *Third Point*, corporations appear to be increasingly settling with activists instead of litigating the merits of a dispute.\(^ {106}\) And even more telling, the institutional investors who are dissatisfied with such settlements are not suing boards in courts for breach of fiduciary duties, but rather voice their dissatisfaction directly toward boards.\(^ {107}\)

\(^{101}\) The “two-tiered” pill at issue triggered at 10% for activist Schedule 13D filers and 20% for passive Schedule 13G filers. Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, 2014 WL 1922029, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014).

\(^{102}\) Id. at *1.

\(^{103}\) Id. at *5.


\(^{107}\) See Coffee id, at 24, and JP Morgan’s Report on the 2017 Proxy Season, at 3, https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320739681811.pdf (“Index investors, in particular, have expressed frustration with the number of rapid settlements over the past couple of proxy seasons, viewing them as a usurpation of their right to elect directors. Three of the largest
3. Delaware Courts’ Welcoming and Desirable Reaction to Market Primacy

There is little to suggest that the Delaware courts have actively resisted the move toward extrajudicial market actors playing the predominant role in resolving corporate disputes. To the contrary, the court often seems to accept and acknowledge the change. 108 One clear manifestation of this judicial behavior is the increasing deference to both independent directors and the shareholder vote as legitimizing challenged corporate decisionmaking over cash flow rights, illustrated by the recent holdings in Cornerstone, 109 Corwin, 110 and MFW. 111

In Cornerstone, the Delaware Supreme Court held that independent directors facing a lawsuit challenging a controlling-owner conflicted transaction are protected by the business judgment rule and entitled to a motion to dismiss absent specifically plead loyalty claims. 112 The practical result of granting motions to dismiss is the avoidance of discovery, relieving directors of the need to answer a disgruntled shareholder’s questions, and exempting the directors from judicial disciplining. Instead, this disciplining role is transferred to the market, where institutional investors can leverage their control rights to punish directors they believe improperly approved an unfair conflicted transaction. 113

In Corwin, the court issued another market-centric ruling, holding that a merger approved by a majority of fully-informed and disinterested shareholders is subject to the deferential business judgment rule standard, index investors, representing more than $8 trillion of AUM, have publicly urged portfolio companies to solicit their feedback before settling and/or to adhere to specific guidelines for negotiating settlements that are designed to align activists’ interests with those of other shareholders. Failure to do so risks investors voting against incumbent directors following any unacceptable settlement."

108 Note, however, our saying that the court has “accepted” the move to extrajudicial market actors is not the same as saying that the court has caused this change. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.


110 Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 306 (Del. 2015).


112 Cornerstone, 115 A.3d at 1179—80. This ruling reversed the Court of Chancery’s finding that entire fairness was the applicable standard. Id. at 1175.

113 See, Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 Va. L. Rev. 789, 807 (2007) (“Today, shareholders have much greater ability to act in concert and to influence boards as a result of a variety of developments that include the increasing clout of institutional investors like pension funds and mutual funds.”); Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of Corporate Governance, 40 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 13 (2015) (“Over the past decade, though, the support mainstream institutional shareholders have increasingly afforded to ‘activist’ hedge funds specializing in buying up sizeable stakes in target companies and agitating for change has meant that the activist agenda has had an increasingly pronounced influence in the boardroom.”).
even if the corporation’s directors were negligent in the stages preceding the closing or suffered from a conflict of interest. The court’s reasoning stresses the advantage engrained in voting rights over litigation: “When . . . disinterested equity owners . . . can easily protect themselves at the ballot box by simply voting no, the utility of a litigation-intrusive standard of review promises more costs to stockholders in the form of litigation rents and inhibitions on risk-taking than it promises in terms of benefits to them.”

Fortifying Corwin, Singh held in part that, “when the business judgment rule standard of review is invoked because of a vote,” i.e., the Corwin “cleansing” requirement, “dismissal is typically the result.” In post-Corwin decisions, the Delaware courts have embraced Corwin and announced that fully-informed and uncoerced shareholder approval will render business judgment rule protection “irrebuttable.”

In the context of controlled corporations, MFW provides yet another clear example of the Delaware courts deferring to the shareholder vote when evaluating a challenged transaction. MFW concerned a classic going-private merger, wherein the controller Ron Perelman sought to take his company private by buying out the minority shareholders. Under the governing standard at the time of MFW, controllers seeking to enact a going private merger were subject to entire fairness scrutiny, with the ability merely to shift the burden of proof to plaintiffs if the controller made use of either a fully-functioning special committee of independent directors or a requirement that a majority of the minority shareholders approve the merger. However, MFW contained a crucial factual wrinkle: Perelman

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114 Corwin, 125 A.3d 304 at 305, 312. Practically, this ruling allows shareholders to ratify a breach of Revlon duties.

115 Id. at 313. Corwin has been further strengthened by a recent holding that the appropriate standard of review when Corwin’s shareholder vote “cleansing effect” has been utilized is that of waste. See Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 152 (Del. 2016) (“When the business judgment rule standard of review is invoked because of a vote, dismissal is typically the result. That is because the vestigial waste exception has little real-world relevance.”).


119 Id. at 499.

120 See Kahn v. Lynch Comm’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del.1994).
conditioned the transaction on the use of both of these protections. Ruling as a matter of first impression, then-Chancellor Strine held that a transaction conditioned upon both approval of a functional special committee and an informed minority shareholder vote, rather than simply one or the other, is entitled to business judgment review, rather than a simple burden shift. In so doing, *MFW* offered a path to extract the court from the searching entire fairness review, *so long as the parties involved had the opportunity to exercise their control rights*. Continuing in this same vein, recent *appraisal* actions have been met with an increasing tendency of the Delaware courts to defer to deal price as the dispositive indicator of fair value, again suggesting that the market actors are better positioned to resolve a corporate cash flow conflict than Delaware chancellors.

Relaxed judicial scrutiny and increased reliance on market forces have also appeared outside deal-ratification and appraisal, perhaps most notably in the contexts of “disclosure-only” settlements. In the deal litigation context, plaintiffs often obtain settlements that do not provide for money damages but rather only require defendants to make a few trivial disclosures. *These settlements are problematic not only because they waste corporate resources in the form of attorneys’ fees but also because*

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121 *In re MFW*, 67 A.3d 496, at 499.
122 Id. at 517, 535.
123 Indeed, following the *MFW* decision more than 90% of the going-private mergers initiated by controlling owners added a majority-of-minority condition to the already common use of a special committee approval, taking the path to business judgment rule offered by the court. See, Fernan Restrepo, *Judicial Deference, Procedural Protections, and Deal Outcomes in Freezeout Transactions: Evidence from the Effect of MFW*, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3105169
they can result in sweeping releases for the defendants from potentially meritorious litigation. In *Trulia*, the Delaware court declined to approve settlements relating to so-called disclosure-only class actions. Chancellor Bouchard repeatedly returned to the strong support of the shareholder vote for the merger at issue, suggesting that shareholder ratification bolstered the grounds for dismissal. The Delaware courts thus increasingly appear to doubt that additional fine-grained disclosures benefit sophisticated shareholders and, as a result, have dramatically curtailed disclosure-only settlement (and suits).

In sum, the increased deference of the Delaware courts to market actors reflects the Delaware courts’ correct understanding that sophisticated shareholders are better positioned to adjudge the merits of board decisions and to discipline disloyalty and incompetence. As our theory presented in the next Part will show, Delaware’s retreat in the context of cash-flow conflicts is not purely the result of judicial volition, as many scholars seem to believe, but rather a necessity in order for Delaware to preserve its place as the leading state of incorporation.

II. A THEORY OF THE ROLE OF COURTS IN RESOLVING CORPORATE DISPUTES

Part I chronicled the decline of Delaware courts, which epitomizes the broader death of corporate law. What has led to the death of corporate law and why? This Part presents a novel theory through which we can explain the underlying market dynamics and provide answers.

A. The Role of Courts in an Incomplete Corporate Contract

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126 See id.
128 Recent data concerning litigation rates imply that these decisions had a major impact in deterring litigation, at least in the short run. See, e.g., Meredith E. Kotler & Vanessa C. Richardson, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Disclosure-Only Settlements in M&A Litigation (Sept. 5, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/05/disclosure-only-settlements-in-ma-litigation/ ("[O]nly 64 percent of M&A deals faced litigation during the first six months of 2016, which is the lowest rate since 2009.").
129 *Trulia*, 129 A.3d at 889 ("Trulia's stockholders overwhelmingly supported the transaction. Of the Trulia shares that voted, 99.15% voted in favor of the transaction.").
130 Id. ("[P]ractitioners should expect that disclosure settlements are likely to be met with continued disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address a plainly material misrepresentation or omission…"). See also Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 557 (2015) (Arguing that disclosure-only settlements produce no economic benefit to the stockholder class).
131 See supra note 8.
The basic corporate contract between boards and shareholders is always “incomplete.”\textsuperscript{132} Suppose Marco, an entrepreneur with an idea for a social media business, and Sarah, a venture capitalist looking for promising investments, enter a contract wherein Sarah provides financing to Marco in exchange for a portion of the firm’s future profits. At its core, the bargain is financial: Sarah provides cash to Marco now in exchange for Marco’s promise to generate more cash in the future. However, the contract does not specify \textit{how} Marco will generate more cash in the future. The future also necessarily entails uncertainty, such as the emergence of new competitors requiring recalibration of the business plan. Since Marco and Sarah cannot contractually enumerate every possible future decision,\textsuperscript{133} their contract is incomplete.

This “incomplete-contracts” approach has generated a substantial literature.\textsuperscript{134} In their seminal work on contract design, Professors Robert Scott and George Triantis suggest that parties entering an incomplete contract will seek to minimize the sum of the ex-ante cost of drafting and agreeing upon the contractual terms along with the ex-post cost of litigation disputing items left unresolved by the contract.\textsuperscript{135} Subsequent work by Triantis and Professor Albert Choi engaged the question as to how parties will design an incomplete contract in the corporate context, framing the ex-ante drafting versus ex-post litigation costs as a balance between vagueness and specificity of contractual terms.\textsuperscript{136} Most recently, Scott along with Professors Ronald Gilson and Chuck Sable introduced a model in which


\textsuperscript{133} See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 187, 190 (2005) [hereinafter Scott & Triantis, Incomplete Contracts] (“To a lawyer, a contract may be incomplete in failing to describe the obligations of the parties in each possible state of the world.”).


\textsuperscript{135} Scott & Triantis, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 133, at 188—90.

\textsuperscript{136} Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 Yale L.J. 848, 855 (2010) (“Our objective throughout is to demonstrate the possibility that vagueness may be used strategically to resolve information obstacles to efficient contracting.”).
parties in an incomplete contract prefer more specific terms when the objective at issue is more certain, and conversely prefer vagueness when uncertainty renders a court the most convenient ex-post arbiter.\footnote{137} Notwithstanding these thoughtful treatments of incomplete contracting models, the literature has left a conspicuous gap: There has been little attempt to address the role of courts and their use by parties in the context of a preexisting incomplete contract—particularly in the corporate governance context.\footnote{138} In other words, while earlier models focused on the design of the contractual relationship, we are concerned with the role courts play in an already extant incomplete contract and how the parties will, or will not, use courts when they have the right to do so.\footnote{139} This Article attempts to fill this gap in the literature, beginning with a theory explaining when a principal and an agent might prefer to use a court for dispute resolution and when they might, alternatively, prefer to use discretionary control rights.

\textbf{B. Agent Costs, Principal Costs, and Adjudicatory Costs}

Since Marco and Sarah cannot contractually enumerate all possible future decisions, they must instead decide ex-ante how to allocate the value generated by the firm (cash flow rights) and the decisionmaking authority (control rights) over broad classes of decisions—this is the essence of corporate governance. Parties to an incomplete contract acknowledge that conflicts as to the allocation of control rights and cash flow rights might also arise in the future. When deciding ex-ante how to resolve future disputes arising out of unspecified eventualities in an incomplete contract, parties generally have two options: (1) Assign decisionmaking authority to either the principal, agent, or some combination thereof; or, (2) assign authority to a neutral third party.\footnote{140}

\footnote{138} Scholarship specific to corporate law has emphasized the importance of courts in enforcing the duty of loyalty. See Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Corporate Control and Credible Commitment, 43 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 119, 123—29 (2015) (characterizing the duty of loyalty as a partial solution to the credible-commitment problem faced by controlled companies).
\footnote{139} In our theory, judicial interpretation of corporate contracts is not a future cost that the parties consider at the drafting stage, but rather a tribunal that the parties may, or may not, turn to once disputes arise. Notably, this tribunal is capable of creating default rules that may be designed either to codify or impede the parties’ ability to resolve corporate disputes extrajudicially. It is important to note that while our aim in this Article is primarily to provide a theory that explains the conditions under which principals and agents will or will not turn to judicial resolution in the context of a preexisting corporate contract, our theory also has the potential to inform future discussions of contract design. However, for purposes of clarity and concision, we leave for another day the question of how parties might apply our theory to contract design.
\footnote{140} Because our example of Marco and Sarah abstracts from reality in the interest of
Consider the first option: Parties can assign authority over some broad class of decisions to the agent, the principal, or some combination of both. For example, returning to the Marco–Sarah hypothetical, it may make sense for the parties to assign decision-making authority to Marco, the entrepreneur, over day-to-day business operations because he has superior expertise and information regarding the business itself. And it may make sense for Marco and Sarah to share decision-making authority over setting Marco’s compensation because Sarah might not trust Marco to self-impose a fair level of compensation. The efficiency of any specific allocation of control rights between Marco and Sarah will depend on the balance of “control costs” associated with the agent’s exercise of control rights (“agent costs”) and the principal’s exercise of control rights (“principal costs”).

There are two sub-categories within the broad umbrella of “control costs”: “competence costs” and “conflict costs.” Competence costs arise when the party exercising control makes an honest mistake that reduces firm value. These costs drive the decision to grant Marco decision-making authority over day-to-day business operations, as Marco’s superior expertise and access to information imply he will make fewer honest mistakes than Sarah (i.e., agent competence costs are lower than principal competence costs). Conflict costs, on the other hand, arise when the party exercising control takes a value-reducing action out of self-interest. These costs motivate the decision to split decision-making authority over Marco’s compensation between the two parties—if Marco is a self-interested agent (i.e., there is a risk of high agent conflict costs), he may try to compensate himself at a level significantly above the fair value of his service.

Consider now the second option for resolving incomplete contract disputes: the parties can assign decisionmaking authority to a neutral third party, such as a court. Returning to Marco and Sarah, the parties might decide that a court should determine whether to permit the firm to enter a

conveying the essence of our theory, it is important to make a clarification as to the identity of the agent. The identity of the agent changes depending on whether one is considering a widely-held or controlled firm. If a firm is widely held, the agent is the board and management, whereas if the company has a controlling shareholder, the controller herself will be the agent (in the latter case, the minority shareholders are the principal). Goshen & Squire, supra note 30, at 785. One way of understanding this difference is to consider the fact that in a widely-held company, the competence and conflict costs of the board and managers will lead to agency costs in light of the limited ability of dispersed shareholders to control this behavior (e.g., due to rational apathy or collective-action problems); on the other hand, in a controlled company, the controller’s competence and conflict costs are the cause for greatest concern vis-à-vis agency costs, because the controller is capable of forcing the company (including its board and management) to behave as the controller sees fit. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 30, at 581—82.

141 Goshen & Squire, supra note 30, at 796—808.
142 See id.
143 See id at 785—90 (discussing competence costs), 790—94 (discussing conflict costs).
144 We assume that the parties have chosen a court as the neutral third party rather than an administrative agency or private arbitrator. The analysis however would be the same.
transaction with a different firm also owned by Marco—a “self-dealing” transaction—according to whether the court deems the transaction “fair,” however determined. The only control right that Sarah, the principal, would retain is the right to petition the court to prevent a self-dealing transaction of which she disapproves—a “duty-enforcement right.”145

Herein lies our theory’s critical observation: Just as exercise of control by the principal or agent can impose control costs, so too can exercise of control by the third-party adjudication process. We call these judicially imposed control costs “adjudicatory costs.” Adjudicatory costs can arise in a variety of different contexts, related to both competence and conflict. Courts given responsibility to adjudicate disputes over day-to-day business decisions may lack the expertise and information about the firm’s business that the agents and principal possess. If a court inefficiently blocks a value-enhancing transaction due to lack of information or lack of the expertise necessary to evaluate this information, this behavior imposes adjudicatory competence costs. Concerns with adjudicatory competence costs animate the business judgment rule, which requires courts to defer to disinterested, informed decisions by directors and managers.146

Assuming a professionalized, honest judiciary, we can expect adjudicatory conflict costs related to judges’ conflicts of interest to be minimal. We must extend our theory away from the stylized single-manager/single-investor firm to understand how adjudicatory conflict costs impact the parties’ preference of whether to enlist a court. Instead of a single principal, assume a firm with thousands of principal–investors, each of whom owns a very small portion of the firm’s equity and holds a diversified portfolio of investments. As before, the parties may delegate to a court authority to review challenged conflicted transactions. But, because the principals each hold a very small stake in the firm, they each lack the incentives necessary to vigorously prosecute the lawsuits.147 The principals, therefore, have an incentive to delegate authority to the court to award fees to their counsel, hoping that entrepreneurial “private attorneys general,” motivated by the promise of such fees, will drive the litigation.148 However, these attorneys’ incentives may depart from those of their clients149—

145 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 30, at 798—801 (explaining the function of duty-enforcement rights in corporate governance).
146 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811—13 (Del. 1984); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.1971) (“A board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose.”).
147 This is an instantiation of the fundamental “separation of ownership and control” problem analyzed by Berle and Means nearly a century ago. See generally Berle & Means, supra note 37.
148 The term “private attorney general” was coined by Judge Jerome Frank to refer to one who brings an action to “vindicate the public interest.” Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704, 705 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
149 See, e.g., The Trial Lawyers’ New Merger Tax: Corporate Mergers and the Mega Million-Dollar Litigation Toll on Our Economy, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal
particularly if courts sometimes mistakenly award attorneys’ fees for frivolous litigation. Because the possibility of plaintiff’s counsel’s conflict is only introduced when parties engage the court to resolve this type of dispute, the resulting conflict costs are effectively species of adjudicatory conflict costs. In other words, “adjudicatory costs” are costs borne out of the litigation process at large, not only those costs generated by judges.

Table 1 catalogs various types of conflict and competence costs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Competence Costs</th>
<th>Conflict Costs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principal</strong></td>
<td>• Inadequate information and expertise</td>
<td>• Collective-action problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Low intellectual endowment</td>
<td>• Rational apathy</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• Low emotional endowment</td>
<td>• Holdouts</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Cognitive biases</td>
<td>• Different investment horizons</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Coordination problems</td>
<td>• Different investment goals</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Conflicts due to competing external interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agent</strong></td>
<td>• Inadequate information and expertise</td>
<td>• Shirking (reduced effort)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Low intellectual endowment</td>
<td>• Diverting (self-dealing and inefficient, but self-promoting, decisions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Low emotional endowment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cognitive biases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adjudicatory</strong></td>
<td>• Inadequate information and expertise</td>
<td>• Plaintiffs’ Bar:</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• Low intellectual endowment</td>
<td>• Fee-generating conflicts</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Low emotional endowment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Cognitive biases</td>
<td><em>Courts:</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Coordination problems</td>
<td>• Reputational pressures on judges</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Effects of the judges’ appointment process</td>
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</table>

Reform (Oct. 2012), https://dandodiscourse.lexblogplatform.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/162/2012/10/U.S.-Chamber-Institute-Paper.pdf (discussing the purportedly inefficient, and conflict-based, tendency of plaintiffs’ lawyers to challenge via lawsuit the overwhelming majority of attempted mergers); see also supra notes 127—130 (describing several ways in which the Delaware courts have doctrinally sought to curtail this abusive practice).

Substantial literature covers the “agency costs” associated with this model of litigation. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 (1986). Under our framework, these costs are species of adjudicatory conflict costs, which in turn fall under the larger umbrella of control costs.
Recognizing that principals, agents, and courts all impose control costs clarifies why parties under certain circumstances may wish to delegate decisionmaking authority to courts rather than reserving this authority for themselves and vice versa. Assume a principal with high competence costs (such as a principal with little knowledge of the firm’s business) and an agent with low competence costs (such as an expert) but high potential conflict costs. Assume further the parties anticipate that the agent may engage in self-dealing and therefore wish to prevent harmful conflicted transactions. Consider, as previewed above, two possible governance options: The first option is to give the principal a right to veto any transaction that involves agent’s self-dealing. The second option is to give the principal a right to petition a court to challenge such transactions.

Regarding the first option, the principal—due to her inadequate competence—may be prone to mistakenly applying the veto right, either blocking beneficial transactions or approving harmful transactions. This erroneous application of the veto right would introduce principal competence costs. If the court itself has a comparable level of competence costs (such as with a non-expert court), replacing the competence costs of the principal with the competence costs of the court—the second option noted above—may not reduce total control costs. However, if the court has low competence costs (such as an expert court), this court is likely to make fewer mistakes than the principal when choosing which transactions to block, and thus able to decrease total control costs, rendering the court the better option than the veto right.

The reverse is also true. Assume a principal with low competence costs (an expert investor) and a court with high competence costs (a non-expert court). Here, the principal is likely to make fewer mistakes than the court, making the veto right the more efficient option. If both the principal and court have low competence costs (both the principal and the court are experts), then conflict costs associated with the adjudication process may tilt the scale toward using the veto right. Finally, if both the court and principal have high competence costs, then the principal must decide whether to forego the agency relationship altogether.\textsuperscript{151}

Figure 1 broadly illustrates the interplay between principal, agent, and adjudicatory costs. The principal can hold the agent accountable either via the principal’s own efforts (through the use of discretionary control rights such as shareholder voting) or with the aid of a court (through the use of duty-enforcement rights such as the right to sue for breach of directors’ fiduciary duties). The use of discretionary control rights will give rise to principal costs and agent costs, while the use of duty-enforcement rights

\textsuperscript{151} The unfortunate implication of this conclusion is that countries without courts below some threshold level of adjudicatory costs are unlikely to have capital markets at all. See Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 4 (2000) (“At the extreme of no investor protection, the insiders can steal a firm’s profits perfectly efficiently. Without a strong reputation, no rational outsider would finance such a firm.”).
will also add adjudicatory costs into the mix.

**FIGURE 1: PRINCIPAL COSTS, AGENT COSTS, AND ADJUDICATORY COSTS**

![Diagram: Principal Costs, Agent Costs, and Adjudicatory Costs]

Generally stated, when parties determine that total control costs will likely decrease with the addition of adjudicatory control costs—that is, principal costs + agent costs are higher than principal costs + agent costs + adjudicatory costs—conventional economic assumptions suggest that parties will assign more decisionmaking authority to the court. The opposite holds true as well. When parties determine that adding adjudicatory control costs will likely increase total control costs—that is, principal costs + agent costs + adjudicatory costs are higher than principal costs + agent costs—our theory predicts that the parties will assign more decisionmaking authority to the principal, the agent, or both, without involving the court.

1. Total Control Costs by Decision Type

Having introduced a framework in which parties to a corporate contract will seek to minimize the sum of principal costs, agent costs, and adjudicatory costs, we turn now to an important subsidiary question: What factors contribute to the size and balance of principal, agent, and adjudicatory costs? In this subsection, we discuss one such factor: decision type. Specifically, we argue that the magnitude of total control costs in a given situation will vary based on the type of decision that a court might be enlisted to adjudicate. Specifically, we consider two broad decision types: First, judicial decisions intended to reduce the competence costs of either the principal or the agent; second, judicial decisions intended to reduce the conflict costs of either the principal or the agent.

**Competence Costs.** Generally, courts are not enlisted to try to reduce the competence costs of either principals or agents. The adjudicatory process is inherently inadequate to pass meaningful judgment on the

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152 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
competence of corporate actors and very likely to increase total control costs if granted such power. Consider a paradigmatic case involving the competence of corporate actors: selection of a company’s board of directors. Delegating authority to the courts to consider whether individuals ought to sit on the company’s board would likely be quite costly. Judges do not have the competence to select directors, nor do judges employ anything resembling a human resources department to help discern the abilities of director nominees. Therefore, involving judges in the evaluation of director nominees would likely impose high adjudicatory competence costs. Additionally, judges do not bear the consequences of their decision, and there is no mechanism to hold judges accountable for their mistakes in appointing the wrong directors. To make matters worse, delegating control to courts over the nomination of directors may also introduce the distorted incentives of the plaintiffs’ bar. Insofar as the plaintiffs’ bar may wish to pursue unnecessary litigation, involving the judicial process in the evaluation of director nominees is therefore likely also to impose adjudicatory conflict costs.

In contrast, shareholders have incentives to correctly appoint directors. If principal competence costs are relatively low (such as with institutional investors), we expect shareholders to be capable of competently selecting individuals to sit on the company’s board. Even if shareholder principal costs are high (such as with retail investors), this will still not justify using courts to nominate directors. In such a case, and despite the obvious conflict, it will be better to allow the agent (i.e., management or the existing directors) to nominate directors because the agent is more competent than the courts, and is subject to accountability mechanisms such as a compensation package and hostile takeovers.

In light of the foregoing risk of high adjudicatory costs, our theory predicts that courts will generally be limited by the parties to a minor role in director elections and other decisions involving the competence of principals and agents, tasked only with refereeing procedural issues rather than ruling on the candidates’ substantive merit. Indeed, this is precisely what the law reflects.153

Conflicts Costs. Courts have traditionally been far more involved in decisions intended to reduce the conflict costs of either the principal or the agent. Corporate conflict costs typically emerge from disputes over either the allocation of cash-flow rights or control rights between the principal and agent. Consider a conventional cash-flow conflict: “squeeze-out” mergers in which a controlling shareholder seeks to buy out minority shareholders in

153 In Delaware, courts scrutinize board actions related to elections under the Blasius standard, whereby the board must demonstrate a “compelling justification” for “acts done for the primary purpose of impeding the exercise of stockholder voting power,” a quintessential procedural restriction. See, Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (1988). We consider ordinary business decisions among the paradigmatic cases in which our theory predicts courts’ role to be limited. See, e.g., Aaronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
order to obtain full control of the company. In squeeze-outs, the controlling shareholder’s financial interest is clearly implicated, suggesting that leaving the decision with the board (perhaps under the influence of the controlling shareholder) might be unwise insofar as it risks agent conflict costs. The parties may thus wish to enlist the courts, which can scrutinize the board’s decisionmaking process in accepting the terms and price of the squeeze-out.

The exact role of courts in supervising such a conflict will depend on the magnitude of principal costs relative to that of the court in any given situation. Unlike Delaware courts, not all courts are able to offer a sound opinion on valuation, thus imposing adjudicatory competence costs. Moreover, the rent-seeking tendencies of the plaintiffs’ bar are likely to impose adjudicatory conflict costs via a desire to litigate squeeze-out transactions at a frequency that may be higher than what is efficient.

Assuming, however, professional courts such as those in Delaware, the relative sizes of principal costs and adjudicatory costs will likely be the primary determinant of the role such a court might have. For example, consider a proposed squeeze-out in a firm held primarily by retail investors. In such a case, retail investors may impose relatively high principal costs in the form of competence costs, due to lack of information and expertise regarding the pricing of the deal, and conflict costs, insofar as some shareholders might frustrate an efficient transaction by demanding an unreasonably high price (a holdout problem). Therefore, in this situation, the court might be enlisted to perform a substantive role, evaluating the fairness of the squeeze-out. If we imagine the same squeeze-out, but with institutional investors instead of retail investors, things become very different. Institutional investors may impose relatively low principal costs, due to greater expertise in valuation and a lower likelihood of unreasonably holding out. In such a case, the court might be enlisted to perform a more procedural role, refereeing the integrity of the vote of disinterested shareholders.

2. Principal Competence and Ownership Composition

As we have explained, principal competence affects the optimal option between using courts or discretionary control rights to resolve corporate disputes. Because investor sophistication is a proxy for investor competence, we suggest that the sophistication of a firm’s investor base helps to predict whether or not it is efficient to allocate conflict-resolution authority to a court or, alternatively, keep authority with investors for

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154 See supra note 30, and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 3—4 (describing the uniqueness of the Delaware courts’ expertise in these matters).
purposes of extra-judicial dispute resolution. Specifically, our theory predicts that investor sophistication should influence the degree to which market participants employ courts to resolve corporate disputes.

To illustrate the significance of investor characteristics in determining whether the use of a court is optimal, it is helpful to consider firms of varying hypothetical investor bases. Consider first our now-familiar example of Marco, the entrepreneur of a technology company, and Sarah, the investor. Assume that Sarah’s venture capital firm has considerable experience in the technology industry and also that Sarah’s firm owns a sizeable stake in Marco’s company. Assume further that the remaining equity shareholders of Marco’s company are similarly experienced and sophisticated, generating relatively few principal competence costs. If we assume finally that each investor, like Sarah, owns a significant stake of the company, we can also generally expect relatively low principal conflict costs, as Sarah et al. have a clear financial incentive to ensure the success of Marco’s company. Given Marco’s company’s minimal exposure to principal costs, our theory predicts that the parties will prefer for the principals and agents to retain significant dispute-resolution authority and only rarely seek judicial oversight. This comports with what we observe in reality, as venture capitalists (“VCs”)—who comprise only a small portion of investors in U.S. public companies—often negotiate for control rights at a high level of specificity, reserving considerable discretionary control rights.

Now consider the other end of the investor spectrum: Instead of Marco’s company, consider a dispersed-ownership firm whose equity is owned almost entirely by small, diversified retail investors who know little about managing a large company. This lack of know-how and small financial stake will likely generate high principal competence costs and principal conflict costs, respectively. In such a situation, one might expect

157 One can, of course, imagine situations in which principal conflict costs would be high. For example, if the venture capitalists also own stakes in the company’s competitors, we might expect them to agitate for corporate action that would help their other portfolio companies but reduce the firm’s value.
158 The coherence of this theory is also supported by the Scott and Triantis formulation. Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 Yale L.J. 814 (2006).
159 In other words, the parties opt for a complete contract rather than incomplete one. Id. at 814. One might also think of this problem in terms of rules versus standards. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992). Venture capitalists and other sophisticated parties can convert nebulous standards into more precise rules that provide a more optimal arrangement for their specific circumstances.
160 There is a large literature discussing the ways in which small ownership stakes leads to distorted incentives for investors, specifically noting that the minimal financial incentive to monitor company management leads both to so-called “free-rider” and “rational apathy” problems. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 189 Mich. L. Rev. 520 (1990). For discussion of shareholders’ collective-action problems see also Hannes, Super Hedge Fund, supra note 98, at 172—73. For discussion of shareholders’
parties to make more frequent use of judicial dispute resolution, relying on courts to reduce conflict costs.

As a final example, consider a hypothetical intermediate firm: Imagine a firm owned primarily by large institutional investors with (1) some level of sophistication greater than that of retail investors but less than the industry-expert VCs discussed above; and (2) financial stakes in the firm greater than small retail investors but less than highly-invested VCs, say at a rate somewhere between one and ten percent of the firm’s total equity. In this hypothetical firm, we expect that the institutional investors’ moderate sophistication will lead to principal competence costs lower than those associated with retail investors, but higher than those associated with VCs. We should further expect that the institutional investors’ moderate ownership stakes will lead to principal conflict costs lower than those generated by retail investors but higher than those generated by VCs. In such a scenario, of moderate principal competence costs and moderate principal conflict costs, our theory predicts that the parties will enlist courts for dispute resolution more than in our first example of the VC-owned firm but less than in our second example of the retail-investor-owned firm.

In the next Part, we apply our theory to the typical modern U.S. corporation, with attention to the corresponding declined role of the Delaware courts.

III. APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DELAWARE

Part I described the death of corporate law, illustrated by the waning role of the Delaware courts and the increasing tendency for market participants to resolve conflicts outside of courts. Part II introduced a theory that explains how principal costs affect shareholders’ preference between using discretionary control rights and courts. Our theory demonstrated that the optimal role of courts depends on the balance of principal costs, agent costs, and adjudicatory costs associated with the allocation of a given control right. This Part applies our theory to explain the declined role of Delaware courts in resolving corporate disputes (III.A.) and to provide predictions for the future of Delaware as the leading state of incorporation (III.B).

A. Applying the Theory to the Decline of Delaware Courts

To explain the changed role of Delaware courts we need to analyze the current balance of control costs to identify which player’s costs—the principal, the agent, or the courts—have led to the decline of Delaware courts.

Courts. We begin with the observation that the Delaware courts’ competence and conflict costs appear to have remained relatively unchanged over the last several decades. The Court of Chancery, Delaware’s specialized business-entity court, has changed little in size, composition, and competence, and its judges are selected via the same process. In short, adjudicatory control costs have likely remained largely unchanged. Our theory, therefore, suggests that Delaware’s shift in power from courts to market actors must trace to a change in either agent or principal costs.

Agents. There is little reason to believe that inherent agent costs, i.e., costs imposed by managers’ exercise of control, have significantly changed over the last few decades. As to competence costs, overall there does not appear to have been a pivotal shift in managerial competence. Perhaps more importantly, as courts are tasked largely with monitoring management conflicts rather than competence, a change in the latter seems unlikely to catalyze a changed role for the court.

Regarding conflict costs, we have found no evidence that, on average, management has undergone a noteworthy shift in conflicted behavior. To be sure, board oversight practices have evolved to encourage directors to more closely scrutinize firms’ senior executives, but, similar to other trends we described in Part I, this change is also driven by shareholders increased use of discretionary control rights. Theoretically, changes in executive compensation techniques might affect management conflict costs over time. That being said, there are competing theories as to whether executive compensation is structured to reduce agency costs or is itself a manifestation of agency costs. Since 2000, there have been changes in the size (amount of compensation has decreased) and composition (compensation has shifted from options-based to restricted stock-based), but the empirical findings as to the effects on firm performance and risk-taking are inconclusive.

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162 See Holland, supra note 161, at 776—77.


164 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. Econ. Persp. 71 (2003).

165 See, Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix, Dirk Jenter, Executive Compensation: A
Similarly, the widespread use of “golden parachutes”—a part of executive compensation offering a substantial payment to management upon a sale of control—should theoretically incentivize managers to sell the corporation and alleviate the problem of management entrenchment. However, in practice, a substantial part of hedge fund activism is about facilitating merger and acquisition activity. This reality implies that management conflict has not declined substantially on this front as well. What has changed is the method to cope with management conflict.

Principals. This leaves one remaining possible culprit for the courts’ changed role: a change in principal costs. If principal costs at widely-held firms have declined over the past several decades, then our theory suggests that the reduced costs associated with investor control have led to a shift in authority from courts to shareholders—a result that comports with the narrative presented in Part I and the theory expounded in Part II. Indeed, the decline of the Delaware courts has coincided with a shift in the ownership structure of U.S. equity markets; retail investors have vacated their place to large, sophisticated institutional investors.

A few figures help to shed light on the magnitude of this change: In 1965, American mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies held shares of U.S. corporations worth a total of $36 billion, $43 billion, and $21 billion, respectively. The holdings of these three groups amounted to a relatively small fraction of the stock market: 5% for mutual funds, 6% for pension funds, and 3% for insurance companies. By 1980 the portion of

Survey of Theory and Evidence, NBER (2017) at http://www.nber.org/papers/w23596; Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There, in Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Vol 2 Chapter 4, 211 (2013). Given the conflicting and inconclusive evidence, we consider any broad claim on the relationship between executive compensation and management conflict to be speculative at this time.

Empirically, however, the effects of golden parachutes on management incentives are inconclusive. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al., Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders, 25 J. Corp. Fin. 140 (2014) (showing the conflicting effects that golden parachutes have on management incentives).

See, JP Morgan’s Report supra note 107, at p. 4 (“More than 500 M&A-related campaign demands were made by activists globally during the 2016 and 2017 proxy seasons, representing approximately 75% of total value demands for that period.”).


the equity market held by these three groups had grown, and the division between them had changed: 3.1% for mutual funds, 17.4% for pension funds, and 5.1% for insurance companies. At the time, the market capitalization of listed domestic companies was $1.36 trillion, and institutional investors held $436.2 billion in equity altogether.

These figures have since continued to grow rapidly. In 2016, mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies held shares worth $9.1 trillion, $4.15 trillion, and $655 billion of U.S. corporation shares, respectively. Even with the tremendous growth of the equity market itself, with an aggregate market capitalization of over $25 trillion for all public companies in 2016, these three groups of institutional investors collectively hold over 50% of the market.

Within this group of institutional investors, a few money managers wield especially significant influence. For instance, in the commercial sector, BlackRock Funds holds $5.1 trillion in assets under management; Vanguard Group holds $3.5 trillion; State Street Global Advisors holds $2.3 trillion; Fidelity Investments holds $2 trillion; and Prudential Financial holds $1.176 trillion.


THE DEATH OF CORPORATE LAW

measure, enormous. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association College Retirement Equities Fund and California Public Employees' Retirement System oversee assets worth $851 billion and $295.8 billion, respectively.

Institutional investors in the aggregate thus effectively control the market. In most firms, institutional investors collectively hold a dominant position. Their presence, considered in terms of ownership concentration, is even more pronounced in the largest corporations, with institutional shareholders owning on average over 70% of the stock in such firms. Even among institutional investors, the market is highly concentrated. The largest twenty-five institutions hold more than 30% of all U.S. corporate shares, and the largest ten managers managed 23.4% of all assets.

Moreover, the three biggest asset management institutions, BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street, when considered in combination, are the "single" largest shareholder, with mean ownership over 17%, in many

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183 See Aguilar, supra note 174 ("Simply stated, institutional investors are dominant market players ...").

It should, therefore, come as no surprise that, given these sizable stakes, and related market concentration, institutional shareholders have become capable of influencing the behavior of their portfolio companies. Not only are these institutional investors more sophisticated than the retail investors of years past, but their ownership blocks are far larger, reducing coordination costs and providing greater monitoring incentives.\footnote{Indeed, doing so may violate their fiduciary duties under federal law. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2017) (prohibiting the “exercise voting authority with respect to client securities” by investment advisers without implementation of “written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure that [the adviser] vote[s] client securities in the best interest of clients”); Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Exercise of Shareholder Rights, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,731, 61,733 (Oct. 17, 2008) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509) (“[ERISA fiduciary duties] require the responsible fiduciary to vote proxies on issues that may affect the economic value of the plan’s investment”).}


To the extent that institutional investors are hesitant to take an active role in agitating for corporate change, other investors—such as activist hedge funds—now step in to fill the void.\footnote{Gilson & Gordon, supra note 22 (arguing today’s largely passive institutional investors suffer from “rational reticence,” and activist hedge funds step in to make up for this).}

These changes have created costs of their own,\footnote{See generally Rose, supra note 168.} but, on balance, it seems that principal costs are lower now than they were several decades ago. Thus, the relative costliness of adjudication suggests under our theory that shifting control from courts to shareholders would be preferred—consistent with the evidence presented in Part I. Put simply, shareholders seem to have become sufficiently sophisticated and incentivized to fend for themselves, reducing the need for judicial assistance.

\subsection*{B. Delaware’s Future in Corporate Law and Governance}

This Section turns to the implications and predictions for the future. Section III.B.1 considers the role of courts in an age of sophisticated shareholders and argues that changes in the composition of U.S. shareholders imply, under our theory, a more limited role for courts and litigation more generally. Section III.B.2 then narrows the scope, discussing the future role of the State of Delaware. We predict that changes to the aggregate character of public shareholders will lead to a more limited role.
for the state, but also that these changes are unlikely to cause a mass exodus of public corporations to other jurisdictions. However, to ensure its continued dominance and participatory role in the corporate law space, Delaware will have to adapt to the decreased need for court-centered dispute resolution.

1. The Role of Courts in an Age of Sophisticated Shareholders

Under our theory, parties seek to minimize the sum of principal, agent, and adjudicatory costs. As such, an increase in principal sophistication (reducing principal competence costs) suggests that parties will have less of a need for judicial dispute resolution, as the latter risks introducing unnecessary adjudicatory costs. Instead, market participants are likely to utilize discretionary control rights to achieve their objectives.

Indeed, we have already observed several salient instantiations of this trend, whereby market participants stay away from courts, electing instead to use discretionary control rights to resolve various corporate disputes. The presence of repeat-player sophisticated shareholders militates toward a corporate law environment in which courts play a relatively procedural role, with substantive decisionmaking authority retained by principals, agents, or some combination thereof.

As the role of courts has become more procedural, we can observe a shift of the locus of power from public decisionmakers, such as courts, to private decisionmakers, such as proxy advisers and large institutional investors. This shift away from substantive judicial adjudication toward the exercise of discretionary control rights has resulted in boards being more constrained by the likely responses of large institutional shareholders and proxy advisers than by the anticipated legality of their actions under Delaware law.

When institutional investors wield the necessary ownership to make a “withhold vote” a threat, sometimes coupled with

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192 See supra Part II (outlining our theory and the aim of parties to minimize the sum of principal, agent, and adjudicatory costs).
193 See supra section I.B.1 (providing several examples of this private ordering).
194 See supra section I.B.1.I.B.
195 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 673, 688 (2005) (”[P]owerful CEOs come on bended knee to Rockville, Maryland, where ISS resides, to persuade the managers of ISS of the merits of their views about issues like proposed mergers, executive compensation, and poison pills. They do so because the CEOs recognize that some institutional investors will simply follow ISS’s advice rather than do any thinking of their own.”); supra section I.B.1 (noting that, despite indications of their legality, golden leash poison pills have largely been abandoned by management out of fear of retribution by institutional owners); cf. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Investors to Directors, “Can We Talk?” N.Y. Times (July 21, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/21/investors-to-directors-can-we-talk/ (“In the age of activism that is clearly not going away, it would seem that some form of engagement from directors with shareholders . . . would go a long way toward helping boards work on behalf of all shareholders rather just the most vocal.”).
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“majority vote” and “proxy access” mechanisms, it is entirely sensible for board members to reorient their focus toward the approval of institutional investors and other private decisionmakers rather than of the judiciary. This increased influence of private decisionmakers may portend a transformation of U.S. corporate-dispute resolution from “court-centered” to “control-centered” dispute resolution. In turn, this dynamic may render corporate law irrelevant.

2. Delaware’s Future Challenges

In this section, we turn from the macro-level observation to the microcosmic implications for the State of Delaware. Many scholars have attributed Delaware’s dominance in the field of corporate law at least in part to its judicial system. Professor Roberta Romano, in describing Delaware’s dominance, cites Delaware’s “substantial body” of precedent, its “judicial expertise,” the predictability of its judicial decisions, and the likelihood that “any specific corporate law issue will be, or has been, adjudicated” by its courts. Professor Michael Klausner likewise identifies the “network benefits” associated with Delaware judicial precedents as a key factor contributing to Delaware’s success in attracting corporate charters. Per Klausner, firms incorporate in Delaware in part to realize the benefits of positive “network externalities” produced by Delaware

196 See supra note 94.
197 In addition to the cases mentioned in Part I, consider also other scattered, but increasingly conspicuous, instances of institutional investors disciplining directors without judicial assistance. A recent paper examined whether “institutional investors follow directors from old to new firms with their equity investments” and answered with “an emphatic yes.” See, Jay Dahya & Richard Herron, Do Investors Follow Directors? 26 (Mar. 30, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2943540. In other words, corporate directors must operate under the assumption that major investors will reward directors for good performance (and correspondingly withhold this reward for bad performance) even after directors have moved on to a different firm. Similarly, Dimension Fund Advisors, the eighth-largest mutual fund in the U.S., recently threatened to vote against directors who approved frowned-upon (by Dimension Fund Advisors, that is) governance mechanisms not only at the specific company that implemented the mechanism but at all boards upon which that directors sits. See Toonkel, supra note 35.
198 See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, Why Delaware Must Retain Its Corporate Dominance and Why It May Not, in Can Delaware be Dethroned? 227 (Stephen M. Bainbridge et al. eds., 2018) ("[T]he most important reason for the Delaware dominance in corporations is judicially based.").
199 Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 3, at 277—78; Romano, State Competition, supra note 3, at 722.
200 See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757, 841—51 (1995) ("[T]o the extent that future judicial interpretations are beneficial, they are network benefits associated with particular corporate contract terms."). For a more skeptical view of the Delaware courts, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 439, 459 (2001) ("[T]here are signs of growing discomfort with the more extreme forms of unpredictable ex post decisionmaking that have sometimes been characteristic of . . . the Delaware courts.").
decisions. These theories are premised on the assumption that Delaware courts play an active and substantive role in corporate governance.

If Delaware’s judicial system is indeed responsible for the state’s success in attracting corporate charters, then a decline in the courts’ opportunity to resolve corporate disputes may imply that market centrist risks Delaware ceding its prominent position. This risk would be particularly acute to the extent that the judicial system’s importance stems from its substantive role in adjudicating corporate disputes. If the courts’ judicial expertise in resolving these highly technical disputes is critical, then a shift away from adjudication toward discretionary control rights would seem to provide less reason for firms to incorporate—or stay incorporated—in Delaware. Similarly, if Delaware’s success hinges on the network benefits associated with the interpretation of its precedents, the diminished importance of these precedents would imply less reason for firms to turn to Delaware.

However, there are at least two reasons to suspect that the increase of market participants employing discretionary control rights will not lead to Delaware entirely relinquishing its dominance as a corporate governance forum. First, even if the substantive role of the Delaware courts is diminished, Delaware’s courts are still very much operationally effective. The Chancery Court renders expert decisions quickly and efficiently, without juries, and based mostly on written testimonies. There is little reason to expect other states to surpass Delaware in this regard—even as the Delaware courts’ substantive role declines, other states would have to incur substantial costs to match, and overcome the positive “network externalities” associated with, Delaware’s operational efficacy.

Second, there are at least some transaction costs associated with reincorporation, although scholars have debated the precise magnitude

201 See id. at 842—48.
202 See Klausner, supra note 200 and accompanying text.
203 See Savitt, supra note 4; The well-recognized advantages of the Delaware Courts in this respect remains intact. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 Del. J. Corp. L. 885, 917—19 (1990) (“Additionally, the small, expert, and nondiverse Delaware judiciary reduces agency costs in two ways. First, Delaware has only one trial court with jurisdiction to hear corporate cases, the court of chancery (in which no jury trials occur). Appeals go directly to the Delaware Supreme Court which has only five justices. . . . Second, as with the Corporate Law Section, the judges in Delaware are expert in corporate law. They are highly able to understand, interpret and enforce the statute provided them.”); Kenju Watanabe, Control Transaction Governance: Collective Action and Asymmetric Information Problems and Ex post Policing, 36 N.W. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 45, 102 (2016) (“As a court of equity, the Chancery Court has no juries. This assures that the court resolves factual issues quickly, even in situations in which trials need to be held, and without the risk of making errors that may result from having a lay jury.”).
204 See Watanabe, supra note 203, at 102.
205 In addition to the direct costs of reincorporation, path dependence is an additional cost that might limit incorporation and reincorporation in other states. Cf. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127, 162 (1999); A. Gilchrist Sparks III & Daniel D. Matthews, Delaware’s Continued Resilience: The Next Hundred Years, in Can Delaware be
thereof. So long as Delaware refrains from imposing inefficient adjudicatory costs that exceed the transaction costs of reincorporation, Delaware appears poised to retain its historical prominence. An inefficient, litigation-friendly regime, however, will increase transaction costs and threaten the position of the state of Delaware as the leading state of incorporation. Thus, Delaware courts must align themselves with shareholders as a whole, not with nominal shareholder plaintiffs and their lawyers.

Thus far, Delaware seems to be resisting the urge of the plaintiffs’ bar to increase the quantity of corporate litigation. As we have observed,
Delaware courts have begun to empower shareholders to use discretionary control rights over cash flow rights conflicts, which require the **procedural** involvement of courts, rather than duty-enforcement rights, which require **substantive** judicial involvement.\(^{210}\) The Delaware courts have accorded greater weight to shareholder approval of a merger vis-à-vis post-transaction lawsuits,\(^{211}\) limited the exposure of independent directors approving conflicted transactions,\(^{212}\) applied the business judgment rule to controlling shareholder self-dealing transactions when approved by both independent committee and disinterested shareholders,\(^{213}\) restricted the use of the statutory appraisal right by assigning substantial weight to the merger price,\(^{214}\) and curtailed disclosure-only settlements.\(^{215}\) Delaware has simultaneously approved the use of forum selection clauses in corporate charters and bylaws, helping corporations to prevent the plaintiffs’ bar from migrating to more litigation-friendly forums.\(^{216}\)

Here again, it bears mentioning: While Delaware courts have actively developed doctrine that facilitates private ordering and reduce Delaware’s role as corporate arbiter, this retreat was not the product of judicial volition but rather the product of market necessity. In order to preserve its dominance as the leading state of incorporation, Delaware had to pull back from its former substantive role in accordance with the idea that has animated this Article: The more competent shareholders become, the less important corporate law will be.

\(^{210}\) See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing duty-enforcement rights).

\(^{211}\) Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A. 3d 304, 309 (Del. 2015).

\(^{212}\) In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. Stockholder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173, 1182 (Del. 2015). Cornerstone has left market participants responsible for disciplining independent directors who approve conflict transactions.


\(^{214}\) See supra note 124.

\(^{215}\) In In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016), the Delaware Chancery made clear it intends to scrutinize disclosure-only settlements much more carefully going forward. See also Walsh & Sims, supra note 125, at 1—3; J. Travis Laster, A Milder Prescription for the Peppercorn Settlement Problem in Merger Litigation, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 129, 130 (2015) (“I agree wholeheartedly with the professors’ diagnosis of the underlying problem of excessive M&A litigation and their identification of routine disclosure-only settlements as a contributing cause.”).

\(^{216}\) Sidley Austin, Delaware Legislature Approves DGCL Amendments Endorsing Delaware Forum Selection Clauses and Prohibiting Fee-Shifting Provisions (Jun. 15, 2015), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2015/06/delaware-legislature-approves-dgcl-amendments (“As expected, the Delaware State Legislature approved amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) that will (i) authorize forum selection clauses in the charters or bylaws of Delaware corporations . . . , (ii) prohibit clauses designating only courts outside of Delaware as the exclusive forum for internal corporate claims and (iii) invalidate fee-shifting provisions in the charters or bylaws.”). For the empirical effects of forum selection clauses, see, Cain et. al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2922121.
CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that the compositional transformation of U.S. equity markets has led to the death of corporate law, as the regulation of U.S. publicly traded corporations has shifted from courts to markets. Consequently, Delaware, the leading state of incorporation, and its courts have declined precipitously in importance. In order to explain the decline of Delaware and corporate law more broadly, we introduced a novel theory demonstrating that the difference between the principal’s and the court’s competence is the critical factor when seeking to determine whether parties will prefer judicial intervention or private dispute resolution. When the principal has relatively low competence, parties are more likely to rely on a court to resolve future disputes; the more competent the principal, the less efficient it becomes to enlist courts as opposed to utilizing extra-judicial conflict resolution rights.

Our triangulation of control costs—principal, agent, and adjudicatory—allows not only for an explanation as to the broader decline of corporate law, but also for a postmortem analysis of the decline of Delaware in particular. In stark contrast to its long-held prominence, in many key decisions today the Delaware courts are no longer able to dictate the substantive final terms of corporate conflict resolution. Instead, increasingly sophisticated market participants have elected to side-step the court in part or whole, relying on extra-judicial party-centric activity to resolve corporate conflicts. The Delaware courts have generally accommodated this shift away from judicial resolution. However, our analysis demonstrates that market forces, not Delaware courts, have catalyzed this new balance of corporate control. Today’s institutional shareholders perceive themselves as sophisticated market participants capable of achieving governance aims via activism without judicial assistance and as a result, prefer not to incur adjudicatory costs when avoidable. The Delaware courts are therefore increasingly edged into the role of procedural supervisors, or forced to observe governance tussles from the sidelines.
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